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INTRODUCTION
Part of the great American dream is to own one's own home. But as many
new homeowners find out, what they think is the fulfillment of their dream is
actually a nightmare. Thousands of Americans bought new homes in the 1950s
and 1960s 1 only to discover a short time after purchase that the house con-
tained a major defect; perhaps the plumbing did not work, the roof leaked, the
plaster was cracked, or the foundation was sinking. The major investment of a
lifetime was in jeopardy, and under the doctrine of caveat emptor the home-
owner could not maintain an action against the builder unless the work was
expressly warranted. To protect homeowners from this harsh result, most
courts have either modified or abolished the doctrine of caveat emptor as
applied to the housing industry. 2 Ohio courts have modified the doctrine by
imposing a duty of workmanlike construction upon the builder.3 Other states
have created an implied warranty of habitability
4 to protect the homeowner. 5
1. Privately owned housing starts by year:
New Starts in thousands
Year Number Year Number
1945 325 1956 1325
1946 1015 1957 1175
1947 1265 1958 1314
1959 1494
1950 1908 1960 1230
1951 1420 1961 1284
1952 1446 1962 1439
1953 1402 1963 1581
1954 1532 1964 1530
1955 1627
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSING CONSTRUCTION STATISTICS 1889-1964,
at 20 (1964).
2. Cases in which courts have abolished caveat emptor and granted an implied warranty of habitability
include: Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1968); Theis v. Hever, 264 Ind. 1,280 N.E.2d 300
(1972); and Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
Cases in which courts have modified caveat emptor include Weck v. A:M Sunsire Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d
383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962), and Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957). See
Comment, Implied Warranties-Sale of a Completed House, I CAL. W.L. REV. 110 (1965), and Annot., 25
A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
3. Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
4. Habitability is the "[clondition of premises which permits inhabitant to live free of serious defects to
health and safety." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 639 (5th ed. 1979). "[A]n implied warranty is one imposed by
law... to impel just results between parties." Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265,
272, 149 N.E.2d 181, 186 (1958). "Under an implied warranty of habitability the builder-vendor warrants that he
has complied with the building code of the area and that the residence was built in a workmanlike manner and is
suitable for habitation." Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 92, 563 P.2d 976, 977-78,
rev'd on other grounds, 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978).
5. See supra cases cited in note 2; see also Coney v. Stewarit, 263 Ark. 148, 562 S.W.2d 619 (1978);
Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975); and cases cited in Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
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In these jurisdictions the homeowner receives much the same protection in
the purchase of a house as the Uniform Commercial Code affords purchasers
of goods. 6
The modifications of the doctrine of caveat emptor unfortunately do not
solve the housing problem completely. Because of the increased mobility of
the American public many new homeowners sell their homes before defects
become apparent and actionable. This situation raises the question of whether
a subsequent purchaser of a relatively new home, who buys with the expecta-
tion that it is sound and then discovers a defect shortly thereafter, has a cause
of action against the builder. The Ohio Supreme Court answered this question
in Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie Built Homes7 by holding
that the second purchaser could not establish a cause of action against the
builder. 8
In March 1976 Bonnie Built Homes completed construction of a house
for Alvin Mudge. In the summer of 1976 Mudge sold the house to the Shaffers;
after living in the home approximately one year, they discovered that the roof
leaked badly. Their insurance company paid the cost of the repairs and be-
came subrogated to the rights of the Shaffers for the amount of the repairs.9
The Ohio Supreme Court held that because the Shaffers were not in privity of
contract with Bonnie Built Homes, the insurance company could not establish
a cause of action against the builder.' 0 By so holding, the court refused to join
other jurisdictions that had granted protection to subsequent purchasers. "
The court has continued to cling to the archaic concept of privity of contract
and has refused to recognize the economic and social implications arising
from the sale of homes in today's society. The time has come for Ohio to
abandon the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to subsequent purchasers
and step out of the dark ages of property law into the twentieth century.
This Case Comment will trace the development of Ohio consumer law in
the construction area from strict application of the doctrine of caveat emptor
to the adoption of a duty of workmanlike construction owed to the first
purchaser of an uncompleted home. Then it will review the Ohio Supreme
Court's recent refusal in Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie
Built Homes to extend this duty to second purchasers. This Case Comment
also will suggest why the decision was decided wrongly. Finally, this Case
Comment will offer reasons in support of an extension of an implied warranty
of workmanlike construction to all subsequent purchasers of homes.
6. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1977).
7. 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 416 N.E.2d 623 (1980).
8. Id. at 271, 416 N.E.2d at 625.
9. Id. at 269, 416 N.E.2d at 624.
10. Id. at 269, 416 N.E.2d at 623.
I1. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Redarowitz v. Ohlendorf, - II1.
.... N.E.2d - (1982); Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976);
Casavant v. Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24, 327 A.2d 831 (1974); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768
(1980); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
[Vol. 43:951
BONNIE BUILT HOMES
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN OHIO
A. Caveat Emptor
Before 1966 the doctrine of caveat emptor restricted consumers' rights in
the purchase of real property in Ohio. In Shapiro v. Kornicks " the court of
appeals applied the doctrine to the sale of residential property, thus giving
builders virtual immunity from suits by purchasers:
In the absence of an express warranty, the vendor of residence property, sold
under a written agreement, is not liable to the purchaser for damages because of
defects in the house claimed to have developed after the purchaser came into
possession, unless the vendor was guilty of fraud in failing to make disclosure of
known latent defects or in making fraudulent representations. 
13
In recent years the doctrine of caveat emptor has come under increasing
attack by commentators as an unconscionable restriction on consumer
rights; 4 many courts have felt pressure to modify the doctrine. The Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals responded to this outcry by modifying the doctrine
in Vanderschrier v. Aaron. '5 The court held that in the case of an uncom-
pleted structure the builder implicitly warranted that "it will be completed in a
workmanlike manner and reasonably fit for occupancy." ' 6 The court held,
however, that caveat emptor still applied to the sale of completed struc-
tures. 17
B. Duty of Workmanlike Construction: Mitchem v. Johnson
1. The Decision
The Ohio Supreme Court modified the holding of Vanderschrier in
Mitchem v. Johnson 8 by refusing to adopt that court's implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose (habitability) in favor of a purchaser of an
uncompleted home against the builder-vendor. '9 However, the supreme court
did impose a duty on the defendant builder to construct the home in a work-
manlike manner.20 The court dealt with the problem as though two distinct
causes of action existed: one based on an implied warranty theory, which the
court refused to recognize, and the other based on a contractual duty. 2' This
12. 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955).
13. Id. at 49-50, 124 N.E.2d at 177.
14. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Reality-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV.
541 (1961); Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633
(1965); Roberts, Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967);
Comment, Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habitation in Sale of Residential Dwellings, 43 DENVER L.J. 379
(1966); Comment, Caveat Emptor: A Pierced Shield, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 440 (1966).
15. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
16. Id. at 340, 140 N.E.2d at 820.
17. Id. at 341, 140 N.E.2d at 821.
18. 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
19. Id. at 70, 218 N.E.2d at 595.
20. Id.
21. Syllabus two speaks of an implied warranty that will not be granted. Syllabus three speaks ofa duty that
will be imposed. Id.
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dichotomy of actions, however, has become blurred as later Ohio courts have
interpreted the duty as an implied warranty.
In Mitchem the plantiff alleged that the defendant builder had located the
house in an area with surface water problems. During periods of excessive
rainfall the high soil moisture made the septic tanks ineffective and rendered
the interior toilet facilities partially unusable.22 The plaintiff alleged further
that the defendant had used improper roofing materials and had installed them
improperly, resulting in a defective roof.23 The trial court allowed recovery.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the court's instructions to the jury were
in error. In its charge the court stated that the builder should be held to "an
implied term of the sale that [he] will complete the house in such a way that it
will be reasonably fit for its intended use and that the work [will] be done in a
reasonably efficient and workmanlike manner.",
24
The Lucas County Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,25 and the
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.26 The supreme court held that no implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in favor of a vendee would be
imposed against a builder-vendor on an uncompleted structure.27 Approving
the rationale of Shapiro v. Kornick 28 the court stated that:
the overwhelming weight of authority is that caveat emptor controls the purchase
and sale of a completed structure, and the vendor will not be strictly liable to the
vendee on an implied warranty that the structure is fit or suitable for the purpose
ordinarily intended, even though the vendor was responsible for its construc-
tion. 29
The court, however, did not say that the defendant was entitled to final
judgement.3" Instead, the court remanded, imposing upon the builder-vendor
the duty to construct the building in a
workmanlike manner and to employ such care and skill in the choice of materials
and work as will be commensurate with the gravity of the risk involved in protect-
ing the structure against faults and hazards, including those inherent in its site. If
the violation of that duty proximately causes a defect hidden from revelation by an
inspection reasonably available to the vendee, the vendor is answerable to the
vendee for the resulting damages. 3'
2. Tort or Implied Warranty?
A question arising in later cases is whether the duty imposed on builders
by Mitchem is a tort duty of workmanlike construction or an implied warranty
22. Id. at 67, 218 N.E,2d at 595-96.
23. Id. at 67, 218 N.E.2d at 595.
24. Id. at 68, 218 N.E.2d at 596.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 73, 218 N.E.2d at 599.
27. Id. at 66, 218 N.E.2d at 595.
28. 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955).
29. 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 70, 218 N.E.2d 594, 597 (1966) (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 72, 218 N.E.2d at 598.
31. Id. at 66, 218 N.E.2d at 595.
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of workmanlike construction, similar to the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose (habitability) imposed by the Vanderschrier court. 2 Ohio
appellate courts have responded to the question in both ways. In Benson v.
Dorger33 the Hamilton County Court of Appeals held that the duty recognized
in Mitchem sounded in negligence. The court focused on the language in
syllabus three of the Mitchem opinion containing words generally associated
with tort actions. 4 A different interpretation of Mitchem was asserted by the
Franklin County Court of Appeals when it held in Lloyd v. William Fanin
Builders, Inc. 35 that, when the house was an uncompleted structure, Mitchem
imposed a contractual duty of workmanlike construction upon the builder-
vendor.36 Unlike the Benson court, the Lloyd court focused on Mitchem's
statement that "an implied term of the sale [requires] that ... it be done in a
workmanlike manner ' 37 and concluded that because a sale is a contract the
duty arises ex contractu, not ex delicto. In Tibbs v. National Homes Con-
struction Corp.38 the Warren County Court of Appeals relied on the same
rationale used by the Lloyd court and held that the duty in Mitchem was an
implied warranty of workmanlike construction.39
Of these two approaches the Tibbs and Lloyd approach seems most ac-
ceptable. Although the Benson court was correct when it viewed the words
used by the Mitchem court as those associated with tort actions, both of these
courts possibly failed to recognize that an implied warranty is what Prosser
calls a "freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, orig-
inating in tort and still maintaining a tort character. ' 40 Thus, an implied
warranty can be described in language usually reserved to describe tort ac-
tions. Although the Tibbs and Lloyd decisions appear to give the correct
answer to the question raised in Mitchem, they also seemingly lead to a direct
contradiction of that court's refusal to apply an implied warranty theory to the
sale of housing.4'
In Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie Built Homes42 the
Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the reasoning of Tibbs and Lloyd, 43 while
reiterating the holding of Mitchem by refusing "to apply the theory of implied
warranty... to real-property construction cases." 44 Although the Tibbs and
32. Vanderschrier held in part that the builder implicitly warranted that he would complete the house in a
workmanlike manner. See supra text accompanying note 16.
33. 33 Ohio App. 2d 110, 292 N.E.2d 919 (1972).
34. The court focused on such words as "workmanlike manner," "to employ such care and skill," "if
violation of that duty proximately causes," and "answerable to the vendee for resulting damages" to conclude
that the Mitchem duty is a tort duty. Id. at 115, 292 N.E.2d at 922.
35. 40 Ohio App. 2d 507, 320 N.E.2d 738 (1973).
36. Id. at 510, 320 N.E.2d at 741.
37. Id. at 509-10, 320 N.E.2d at 740.
38. 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977).
39. Id. at 281, 369 N.E.2d at 1220.
40. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 800 (1966).
41. Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 72, 218 N.E.2d 594, 598-99 (1966).
42. 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 416 N.E.2d 623 (1980).
43. Id. at 271, 416 N.E.2d at 624-25.
44. Id., 416 N.E.2d at 624.
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Mitchem positions seem irreconcilable, one possible explanation for their
continued compatability is that the Ohio Supreme Court is considering only a
warranty of habitability and not a warranty of workmanlike construction
when it refuses to apply an implied warranty theory to real property cases.
What the Mitchem court finds objectionable in the application of war-
ranty theory to real property cases is that a "warranty obviate[s] the necessity
of plaintiff's proving, and the triers of the facts finding a lack of good work-
manship, . . . and that such lack of good workmanship proximately caused the
damage." 45 This objection, however, is applicable only to an implied warranty
of habitability, When a plaintiff alleges a breach of a duty or warranty of work-
manlike construction, he must prove that the condition was caused by the
defendant. 46 If the plaintiff cannot prove that the condition was the defen-
dant's fault, he cannot establish a valid cause of action for unworkmanlike
construction, 47 but may bring an action for breach of an implied warranty of
habitability. Thus, the supreme court's objection to an implied warranty
theory has no bearing on a cause of action brought under an implied warranty
of workmanlike construction because in the latter action the plaintiff must
show that the builder failed to exercise proper workmanship and that this lack
of workmanship caused the damage. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, as
the court intended when it set out the duty in Mitchem.48
Recently in Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc. the Ohio
Supreme Court specifically objected to the characterization of the defendant
builder's duty as an implied warranty of habitability, preferring to label it an
"obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner." 50 The court held that this
duty as applied to completed housing was a tort duty. 5' The court expressed
no opinion whether it would reach a different result in the case of an uncom-
pleted house.5 2 Thus, Lloyd and Tibbs are still good law.
In its discussion of the builder's duty the court stated:
The duty implied in the sale between the builder-vendor and the immediate
vendee is the duty imposed by law on all persons to exercise ordinary care. 53 In an
action [alleging poor workmanship] ... the essential allegation is, viz., the
builder-vendor's negligence proximately caused the vendee's damages. The
action, therefore, arises ex delicto.... The obligation to perform in a workman-
like manner using ordinary care may arise from or out of the contract, i.e., from
the purchase agreement, but the cause of action is not based on contract; rather it
is based on a duty imposed by law.
54
45. Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 72, 218 N.E.2d 594, 598-99 (1966).
46. Hubler v. Bachman, 12 Ohio Misc. 22, 23 (1967).
47. Id.
48. See Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 72, 218 N.E.2d 594, 598-99 (1966).
49. 69 Ohio St. 2d 376, 433 N.E.2d 147 (1982).
50. Id. at 378-79, 433 N.E.2d at 150.
51. Id. at 379, 433 N.E.2d at 150.
52. Id. at 378 n.2, 433 N.E.2d at 150 n.2.
53. The court, however, is quick to point out that this duty of ordinary care only applies to the first
purchaser. Id. at 378 n.l, 433 N.E.2d at 150 n.l.
54. Id. at 378-79, 433 N.E.2d at 150 (emphasis in original).
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The court's characterization of the defendant builder's obligation to per-
form in a workmanlike manner as a tort duty is incorrect for several reasons.
First, its language is contrary to that of Bonnie Built Homes and Mitchem-
cases in which the court found that " [t]he duty of the builder-vendor to build a
structure in a workmanlike manner ... [is] a duty arising out of the contract of
sale and not out of a general duty owed to the public at large." 55 Second, the
court's argument that the duty is a tort duty because it is imposed by law also
is unpersuasive: an implied warranty also is imposed by law to achieve just
results between the parties.56
The essential assertion is not that the builder-vendor's negligence prox-
imately caused the vendee's damages, but that the vendee did not receive
what he bargained for-quality workmanship. The builder implicitly warrants
that he will use ordinary care and skill to insure quality workmanship, and the
vendee agrees to compensate the builder for this warranty. If a defect occurs
that was caused by the builder's failure to exercise ordinary care, the builder-
vendor has violated this warranty. The action, therefore, is ex contractu.
If this analysis is correct, why, then, did the Velotta court find that the
defendant's duty was ex delicto? Apparently, the court was unable to distin-
guish between an implied warranty of habitability and an implied warranty of
workmanlike construction. To avoid extending an implied warranty of habita-
bility, the result of which would make the builder an insurer, the court felt it
had to use tort language. In Velotta the court stated:
[U]nder implied warranty, not imposed by Mitchem, the vendee would re-
cover upon showing merely a defect in the structure and causation, even though
the builder-vendor proved ordinary care and skill in the construction of the res-
idence. To permit recovery under implied warranty without requiring proof of
negligence would be in the nature of strict liability .. .
These statements apply only to an implied warranty of habitability, not an
implied warranty of workmanlike construction. Unable to distinguish be-
tween the two types of warranties, the Velotta court refused to use implied
warranty language at all.
The primary distinction between a tort action and an action based on an
implied warranty of workmanlike construction lies in procedural grounds.
The statute of limitations for a contract action is fifteen years,58 while a tort
action has a four year limitation. 9 In addition, punitive damages are available
in tort actions but not in contract actions. 0 Aside from procedural differ-
ences, however, the issue of whether a duty lies in tort or contract is largely
55. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 270, 416 N.E.2d 623, 624 (1980)
(citing Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 73, 218 N.E.2d 594, 597 (1966)).
56. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 272, 149 N.E.2d 181, 186 (1958).
57. Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 376, 377-78, 433 N.E.2d 147, 149 (1982).
58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (Page 1979).
59. Id. § 2305.09.
60. Tibbs v. Nat'l Homes Constr. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977).
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one of semantics. Both actions require the same standard of proof-pre-
ponderance of the evidence. This Case Comment, therefore, will treat the
Mitchem duty as an implied warranty of workmanlike construction.
3. What Constitutes Unworkmanlike Construction?
The Mitchem decision limits recovery to "defects hidden from revelation
by an inspection reasonably available to the vendee." 61 Thus, if the condition
was discoverable at the time of the sale by a reasonable inspection, the ven-
dee loses any cause of action against the builder arising from his duty to build
in a workmanlike manner. A duty, therefore, is imposed upon the vendee to
inspect the house for defects.
A builder is held to a standard of ordinary care except "in the case of an
extraordinarily hazardous transaction." 6 2 Ordinary care refers to the degree
of care that would be exercised by the average builder. The builder must
exercise such care in the construction of the home and in his choice of the
materials and site for the home.63 Thus, if the average builder conducts soil
tests before choosing a site, the defendant builder must act accordingly; if he
does not, he has constructed the house in an unworkmanlike fashion, and the
homeowner should be able to maintain an action against him if, for example,
the septic system fails to function properly. 64 Similarly, if an ordinary builder
could not ascertain that a weld on a structural steel beam was defective, the
defendant builder would not be liable for the resulting collapse of the build-
ing. 6
In assessing whether the construction has been done in an unworkman-
like fashion, the court must look at two categories: the physical work, and the
planning and selection of sites and materials. One consideration in determin-
ing what constitutes unworkmanlike construction in both categories is the
standard of quality required by usage of trade: what techniques and types of
materials would the average builder use in this situation? If the builder uses
the techniques and materials prescribed by the industry standard, the builder
apparently has met the duties of workmanlike construction and ordinary
care.
66
Another consideration in determining what constitutes unworkmanlike
construction is whether the builder has knowledge superior to that of the
average builder. If the plaintiff can prove that the builder knew or should have
known of the defect, even though an average builder would not have known,
61. Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 72, 218 N.E.2d 594, 598 (1966).
62. Id. at 70, 218 N.E.2d at 597.
63. Id. at 66, 218 N.E.2d at 595.
64. Id.
65. See Flannery v. St. Louis Architectural Iron Co., 194 Mo. App. 555, 558, 185 S.W. 760, 761 (1916),
which the Mitchem court expressly approved. 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 69, 218 N.E.2d 594, 597 (1966).
66. A caveat to the use of industry standards as a defense is The T.J. Hooper, 69 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), a
case in which custom and practice in the shipping industry was no defense when the defendant did not take
measures dictated by common sense. Id. at 740.
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the builder's conduct can be viewed as unworkmanlike. 67 If the average
builder possesses superior knowledge, the law presumes he will use it. Hold-
ing the builder to this higher standard also is justified since the vendee prob-
ably is paying more for the house because it was built by a superior builder.
Another important consideration in determining what constitutes un-
workmanlike construction is whether the house was built to the buyer's spec-
ifications. If the buyer specifies a certain material or technique that would be
improper or uncommon if implemented, the buyer should be estopped from
bringing an action against the builder, 6' assuming the builder relates his
knowledge concerning the improper or uncommon use. The ordinary builder
should not be held to the standard of an architect; therefore the builder who
builds according to the buyer's plans need only meet the standard of care
required of the average builder following an architect's plans. 69 But if the
average builder could look at the plans and detect a material mistake or
miscalculation, he should be held liable for unworkmanlike construction if he
fails to correct the mistake. 70 This result is fair because it is unconscionable to
allow the builder to receive compensation for constructing a house that he
knows is defective.
II. EXTENDING THE DUTY TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS
A. Reasons for Refusing Extension: Insurance Company of North America
v. Bonnie Built Homes
In Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie Built Homes71 the
Ohio Supreme Court faced the issue of extending the duty of workmanlike
construction to subsequent purchasers. The court gave three reasons for re-
fusing to extend the duty of workmanlike construction: first, the plaintiff
insurance company was not in privity of contract with Bonnie Built Homes; 72
second, if the builder were held responsible to subsequent purchasers, he
would assume the position of an insurer with absolute liability; 73 and third,
only the legislature, and not the court, had the authority to extend the scope of
protection afforded by the implied warranty of workmanlike construction. 74
In the following sections this Case Comment will examine critically each
reason advanced by the Ohio Supreme Court for disallowing extension of an
implied warranty of workmanlike construction to subsequent purchasers.
67. This notion of superior knowledge is similarto the tort notion as expressed in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which reads as follows: "The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing
an invasion of another's interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising... (b) such superior
attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgement as the actor himself has." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
68. See Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633,
640 (1965); 11 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1399A (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1980) and cases cited therein.
69. See supra authorities cited in note 68.
70. See Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (1936).
71. 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 416 N.E.2d 623 (1980).
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1. Privity of Contract
The first reason advanced by the Bonnie Built Homes court to explain its
refusal to extend the duty of workmanlike construction to the plaintiff was
that no privity existed between the two parties. The court's analysis rested on
two grounds. First, the court, relying on language in Mitchem, refused to
accept the plaintiff insurance company's argument that faulty construction
cases are analogous to products liability cases and so should receive similar
treatment. In two products liability cases, Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp. 75
and Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Co., 76 the Ohio Supreme Court did not
require the plaintiff to be in privity with the defendant to establish a cause of
action. In Lonzrick the manufacturer of defective steel joints was held liable
to a remote purchaser, not in privity, for tort damages. The court held that
the manufacturer implicitly warranted that the products were fit for the pur-
pose used.78 In Iacono the holding of Lonzrick was extended to cover a case
concerning property damages alone. 79
The supreme court held that these two cases were inapposite to Bonnie
Built Homes. 80 It opined that "[t]hey are products liability cases based on
breach of an implied warranty, an area of the law distinct from that involved
here.''8 The court went on to state that "[iun Mitchem, this court ... re-
fused to apply the theory of implied warranty that it had adopted in
Lonzrick ....
The Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning is unsound. The court fails to
recognize that two types of implied warranties exist: an implied warranty of
fitness for a purpose and an implied warranty of workmanlike construction. In
Mitchem the court refused to adopt the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose that it had adopted in Lonzrick. 3 However, the court did adopt a
duty of workmanlike construction 84 that later courts have labeled an implied
warranty of workmanlike construction. 85 The Mitchem court's refusal to
adopt the Lonzrick implied warranty is neither controlling nor persuasive in
faulty construction cases; it simply recognizes that the "theory of implied
warranty" 8 6 adopted by the supreme court is not an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose.
75. 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
76. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
77. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
78. Id. at 235, 218 N.E.2d at 191.
79. Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Co., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 93, 326 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1975).
80. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 271,416 N.E.2d 623,624 (1980).
81. Id., 416 N.E.2d at 624.
82. Id.
83. Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 66, 218 N.E.2d 594, 595 (1966).
84. Id.
85. Tibbs v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977); Lloyd v.
William Fanin Builders, Inc., 40 Ohio App. 2d 507, 320 N.E.2d 738 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes
35-39.




The court did adopt a duty of workmanlike construction that is not dis-
similar to the warranty imposed by the court in Lonzrick. The major differ-
ence between the two warranties is that the plaintiff has the burden in work-
manlike construction cases to show that the defect was caused by the fault of
the defendant builder, whereas in the products liability cases the plaintiff does
not carry such a burden. 87 The difference in warranties is only of degree, not
kind, as the court holds. Any real distinction exists not, as the court holds, in
the protection afforded by the warranties, but because one warranty arises in
a property context and the other in a sale of goods.
In Bonnie Built Homes the builder warranted that he would perform his
work in a workmanlike manner. A remote purchaser should be able to recover
when the structure is not completed in a workmanlike manner. The only
distinction between the two warranties is that the burden is placed on the
plaintiff in an unworkmanlike construction duty case to show that the builder
was responsible for the defects.
88
To show a breach of the duty of workmanlike construction, the plaintiff
must prove that the builder's fault caused the defect. Since the plaintiff carries
such a substantial burden, no reason exists to afford the defendant additional
protection by requiring privity of contract. Courts have used the privity re-
quirement to limit liability and thereby keep manufacturers and builders from
becoming insurers. 89 By extending the Mitchem duty to protect subsequent
purchasers the court would not be placing the builder in a strict liability
situation, because subsequent purchaser-plaintiffs would still have to show
that the builder is responsible for the defect. Therefore, an extension of the
implied warranty of Mitchem to the subsequent purchasers in Bonnie Built
Homes is easier to justify than is the extension of products liability protection
to those purchasers in Lonzrick.90
The second ground advanced by the Bonnie Built Homes court to support
a privity of contract requirement is that:
[t]he duty of the builder-vendor to build a structure in a workmanlike manner is a
duty arising out of the contract of sale and not out of a general duty owed to the
public at large .... In the absence of privity the action must fail because there is
no contractual basis upon which to determine the duty owed. 9 1
The court's view that the duty arises out of the contract of sale is simply a
matter of judicial imposition-in the absence of express language in the con-
tract, little evidence exists to support the argument that the duty arises solely
from the contract. A better view is that the implied warranty or duty "springs
87. See supra text accompanying note 46.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
89. See, e.g., Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907, 910 (S.D. 1979).
90. In the Lonzrick case the manufacturer is placed in a strict liability situation, but in Bonnie Built Homes
the builder is not. Therefore, to avoid placing people in strict liability situations, the court should extend only
the warranty in the Bonnie Built Homes case.
91. Iniurance Co. of N. Am. v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64 Ohio St. 2d269,270-71,416 N.E.2d 623,624 (1980)
(citation omitted).
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from the sale itself." 92 When emphasis is placed on the warranty as protection
independent from the contract, the importance of privity is diminished.
By requiring privity for liability to ensue, the court's holding in Bonnie
Built Homes allows a builder to defeat the purpose of the duty of workmanlike
construction if he conveys the house to a third party who then makes the sale
to the homeowner. 93 Thus, according to the Ohio Supreme Court, if X buys a
home, never lives in it, and then conveys it to Yeither by gift or otherwise, Y
cannot recover from the builder for unworkmanlike construction because Yis
not in privity with the builder.
Two courts faced with a question similar to the one presented in Bonnie
Built Homes also relied on the lack of privity requirement to support their
refusal to extend the warranty to subsequent purchasers. 94 The Illinois Court
of Appeals, while recognizing that privity has "almost entirely" been "elim-
inated in tort actions," 95 held that to extend liability would do violence to the
long-standing distinction between tort and contract. 96 The court does not
recognize that liability based on an implied warranty is a blend of tort and
contract law; the distinction between the two areas is blurred. 97
Ohio should follow the lead of other jurisdictions 98 that permit an exten-
sion of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction to the subsequent
purchaser. To do so, the court would have to view the duty imposed on the
builder to construct the house in a workmanlike fashion as independent of the
parties' contract: the duty would be tied to the house itself, not to the con-
tract. 99 Because the warranty is tied to the house, extending its protection to
subsequent purchasers would not subject the builder to any greater liability
than if the first purchaser had not sold the premises. Once a court recognizes
this modification and its rationale, any limits on the builder's liability are
arbitrary lines drawn for policy reasons.
If the duty to provide quality workmanship is tied to the contract, how-
ever, the parties arguably could modify the duty or eliminate it altogether.
Although the question has not been addressed in Ohio, modifying the war-
92. Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 395, 271 S.E.2d 768,769 (1980). See Beckett v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
376 I11. 470, 473, 34 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1941): "An express warranty is one imposed by the parties to the contract
and is a part of the contract of sale, whereas an implied warranty is not one of the contractual elements of an
agreement but is, instead, imposed by law."; Tharp v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 42 N.M. 443,448,81 P.2d 703,
706 (1938): "An implied warranty is not one of the contractual elements of an agreement. . . nor does its
application or effective existence rest or depend on the affirmative intention of the parties... [but] ji]t arises
independently and outside of the contract." (quoting Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 87, 216 N.W. 790,791
(1927)).
93. See, e.g., Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 92, 563 P.2d 976, rev'd, 194 Colo.
441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978).
94. Mellander v. Kileen, 86 I11. App. 3d 213, 407 N.E.2d 1137 (1980); Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907
(S.D. 1979).
95. Mellander v. Kileen, 86 I11. App. 3d 213, 215, 407 N.E.2d 1137, 1138 (1980).
96. Id. at 214, 407 N.E.2d at 1138.
97. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 59 MINN. L. REV. 791, 800 (1966). See supra text accompanying note
40.
98. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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ranty seemingly would be unconscionable.'00 Evidence that the duty is inde-
pendent of the contract is shown by the imposition of the duty on the parties
without their consent. 0 '
Other courts have replaced completely the privity requirement with a test
of foreseeability: was it foreseeable that defendant's conduct could affect
other people? If the builder's actions were foreseeable, he is liable, and the
duty should be extended despite the absence of privity. 102 Clearly, a builder
should be able to foresee that a house may be sold to a subsequent party and
that a defect caused by the builder's lack of workmanship could affect that
purchaser. The Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted this rationale in
Terlinde v. Neely. It stated that "[t]he key inquiry is foreseeability, not
privity. In our mobile society, it is clearly foreseeable that more than the
original purchaser will seek to enjoy the fruits of the builder's efforts."' 03
Several courts considering whether to require privity have drawn a dis-
tinction based on the type of damages to be awarded-personal injury or
property damages.'04 Privity is not required in an action for personal injuries
based on an implied warranty theory because it is considered a tort action.
However, privity is required for the same action if the damages requested are
property damages because the action would be considered one in contract. In
Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Co. the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to
recognize any material difference between property damages or personal in-
jury damages. The court stated that it "perceive[d] no rational basis for dis-
tinguishing between the two.'"05 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court probably
would not allow a subsequent purchaser to recover on an implied warranty of
workmanlike construction theory even if personal injuries were sustained.
2. The Builder as Insurer: Absolute Liability?
The Ohio Supreme Court's second reason for refusing to extend the
Mitchen duty to subsequent purchasers is that "[a] builder-vendor should not
be required to act as an insurer for subsequent vendees." '06 The court en-
visioned the possibility of a builder being brought into court forty years after
constructing a house because the walls had begun to crack. This picture is far
from realistic. The supreme court seems unduly concerned with the notion of
an absolute liability that will be imposed upon the builder. The court again
fails to recognize the difference between an implied warranty of habitability
100. Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633,
654 (1965).
101. Comment, Torts-Implied Warranty in Real Estate-Privity Requirement, 44 N.C.L. REV. 236, 239
(1965). See supra note 92.
102. See, e.g., Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1980).
103. Id.
104. Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 231, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976) (DeBruler, J.,
dissenting); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). See Comment, Torts-Implied
Warranty in Real Estate-Privity Requirement, 44 N.C.L. REV. 236, 237-38 (1965).
105. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 93, 326 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1975).
106. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 271,416 N.E.2d 623,625 (1980).
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and an implied warranty of workmanlike construction. Absolute liability will
not be imposed upon a builder if the court extends the Mitchem duty of
workmanlike construction. The subsequent purchaser has the same burden of
proof as the first purchaser: he must prove that the latent defect was caused
by the builder's failure to exercise proper workmanship. As Hubler v.
Bachman 107 illustrates, this is not an easy burden of proof to meet. In Hubler
the purchaser failed to show that the cracked plaster was due to the fault of
the builder and, therefore, was unable to recover. 08 Thus, in Ohio an in-
nocent builder would not be subject to the frivolous claims of a greedy home-
owner.
Under the traditional contract model, extending the warranty to sub-
sequent purchasers would make the builder an insurer of sorts. Any warranty
between the builder and original purchaser would be supported by considera-
tion passing between the two parties. When the original purchaser sells to the
subsequent buyer, the builder takes no part in the transaction and receives no
compensation. Allowing the subsequent purchaser to state a cause of action
against the builder would place the builder in the position of an insurer. This
view, however, is far from realistic.
Under the more realistic economic model, extending the warranty to a
subsequent purchaser does not place the builder in the position of an insurer.
In the contract between the first purchaser and the builder, a certain portion
of the compensation is allocated to purchase warranty protection that will
extend for a reasonable period of time. In the contract between the first and
second purchaser, the first purchaser is selling his remaining interest in the
warranty; and although the builder is not a party to this contract, he already
has been compensated for this warranty. By viewing the sale to the second
purchaser as an arbitrary end to the protection afforded by this warranty, the
court is granting the builder a windfall because he has received compensation
for a warranty he will not be required to fulfill. Thus, ifa defect resulting from
the builder's unworkmanlike construction occurs within a reasonable time,
the builder should be liable and should correct the defect, regardless of who
owns the house. The subsequent purchaser's rights are related directly to the
rights of the first purchaser; thus, if the first purchaser could have maintained
an action against the builder, the subsequent purchaser also should have a
cause of action. The builder cannot complain if he is held liable for workman-
ship that fails to meet the standards of a reasonable builder.
3. A Decision Best Left to the Legislature
The Bonnie Built Homes court's third reason for refusing to extend the
Mitchem duty to subsequent purchasers is that the decision to extend war-
107. 12 Ohio Misc. 22 (1967).
108. Id. at 23.
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ranty protection is best left to the state legislature.'9 Although this considera-
tion is valid, in most states, including Ohio, causes of action based on implied
warranty are granted by courts, not legislatures." 0 State legislatures probably
would not pass a statute extending liability based on an implied warranty of
workmanlike construction because of the strong lobbying force behind the
building industry. "' In other areas of the law, particularly products liability,
the Ohio Supreme Court has not waited for the legislature to act and has
extended the scope of liability. 12 No reason exists for the court to refuse to
act in the area of workmanlike construction. The court's argument is nothing
but a make-weight.
B. Other Reasons for Not Extending the Warranty to Subsequent Purchasers
Other state courts facing issues similar to those raised in Bonnie Built
Homes have refused, on other grounds, to extend the warranty of habitability
to subsequent purchasers. "' One such ground is a fear of injustice to the
builder because the first purchaser waived or accepted the defects in the
home. "4 The Mississippi Supreme Court stated, "It would be strange indeed
if, when the original purchaser conveyed the property to another, that his
vendee could resort to the builder for damages for deficiencies in workman-
ship or materials which the original purchaser from the builder had ac-
cepted." 115
The Mississippi Court's analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, the
original purchaser probably could not waive or accept latent defects that
became apparent only after he had sold the house. And second, even if the
original purchaser did waive or authorize the defect for economic or other
reasons," 6 and the second purchaser is "estopped to complain of the quality,
type, class or kind of construction or material, or as to the strength, durability
and appearance of the structure," " 7 the second purchaser has, in most
states, a cause of action against the original purchaser for "silent fraud" I"-
109. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 271,416 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1980).
States that have a statutory warranty include: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-563a (1981); Louisiana,
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (West 1952).
110. See supra cases cited in notes 2 & 5; Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
111. The Connecticut statute does not apply to second purchasers, but the Louisiana statute does. See
supra note 109.
112. See Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Co., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88,326 N.E.2d 267 (1975); Lonzrick v. Republic
Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
113. Strathmore Riverside v. Payer Dev. Corp., 369 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Oliver v.
City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 468 (Miss. 1974).
114. See Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 468 (Miss. 1974).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J.
633, 640 (1965); 11 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1399A (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1980). See also supra
text accompanying note 68.
118. Keeton, Fraud--Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (1936).
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a knowing nondisclosure of a material fact upon which the second purchaser
relied in making the decision to purchase the home.
The more difficult situation occurs when the defect is caused by the
purchaser's faulty design and not by the builder's lack of workmanship." 9
The first purchaser could not recover for this defect, 20 and under the analysis
described above the subsequent purchaser would be similarly estopped from
bringing an action against the builder for this defect. The second purchaser
thus should be advised that the first purchaser designed the home. If this fact
has not been disclosed, the second purchaser has a cause of action for non-
disclosure against the first purchaser-designer.
C. Extension of Warranty to Subsequent Purchasers
1. Policy Reasons for Extension
Courts extending an implied warranty to subsequent purchasers base
their decision on policy reasons. In most cases the courts extend a warranty
of habitability, which places a greater burden on the builder than does a duty
of workmanlike construction. The courts view the warranty as protection for
the American family's single largest expenditure. 2' Without the warranty the
subsequent purchaser would be without recourse against the builder if the
house began to fall apart and became uninhabitable. The homeowner thus
would lose the value of his investment through no fault of his own. A sub-
sequent purchaser of a relatively new home is not deserving of less protection
than the original purchaser. The home is still the single largest expenditure of
the family, and its value can be impaired substantially if major defects
occur.122
Courts also have extended the warranty to protect the "average pur-
chaser who is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make a meaning-
ful inspection" ' of the house. In today's complex society, when specializa-
tion is required in many fields, the days of the rugged self-sufficient individual
have ended. It is unreasonable to expect a layman to detect numerous defects,
some latent, in a new home. The purchaser should be able to rely on the
builder's workmanship, and "courts [should] judicially protect the victims of
shoddy workmanship." 24 Courts have been willing to protect the first pur-
chaser because he is unable to make a meaningful inspection; no justification
119. This may be the case in Bonnie Built Homes, because Mudge did design the house, and there is some
hint that the defective roof was due to faulty design. Brief for Appellee at 7, Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Bonnie
Built Homes, 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 416 N.E.2d 623 (1980).
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 185, 612 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1981); Moxley v. Laramie Builders,
Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979).
122. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 186, 612 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1981).




exists for refusing to extend similar protection to a similarly positioned
second purchaser.
Extending a warranty of workmanlike construction or habitability to sub-
sequent purchasers is simply a recognition of the realities of today's housing
situation. The construction industry in the United States resembles mass
manufacturing: houses are mass-produced in the manner of consumer
goods.'_ The overriding "purpose of a warranty is to protect innocent pur-
chasers and hold builders accountable for their work. With that object in
mind, any reasoning that would arbitrarily interpose a first buyer as an ob-
struction to someone equally deserving of recovery is incomprehensible." 1
26
"Our society is an increasingly mobile one."' 27 The likelihood of a new
home being sold during the first few years after the original purchase is greater
than in the past. Any builder of a new home should foresee the possibility that
the house may be sold and that his work may affect other persons. The builder
should expect to be held responsible for a house for a reasonable time, regard-
less of who owns the home.
When a subsequent purchaser buys a house that is only a few years old,
he has a right, as did the original purchaser, to rely on the builder's workman-
ship. The age of the house is often a major selling point: the subsequent
purchaser probably has purchased a relatively new home instead of an older
home and has paid substantially more for the newer house. A relatively new
home should be free of the defects commonly associated with older houses.
2. Limits on the Extension of Warranty to Subsequent Purchasers
The courts that have extended a warranty to subsequent purchasers have
limited the warranty to latent defects that become apparent after the pur-
chase. 28 The subsequent purchaser is required to make a reasonable inspec-
tion to find all patent defects. 29 The warranty is extended only for a reason-
able period of time. '30 The age of the home, the manner in which it has been
used, and its maintenance record are relevant circumstances in determining
whether the builder should be liable for any latent defects. 3
If Ohio courts adopt a warranty of workmanlike construction that covers
subsequent purchasers, the duty should extend for the life of the home, but
should be limited to latent defects discovered after the sale and not reasonably
discoverable prior to the sale of the home. The subsequent purchaser should
125. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
126. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979).
127. Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 620 (1976).
128. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 186, 612 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1981); Barnes v. MacBrown & Co.,
Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976); Terlinde v. Neeley, 275 S.C. 395, 395, 271 S.E.2d 768, 770
(1980); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979).
129. See supra cases cited in note 128.
130. See supra cased cited in note 128.
131. Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976).
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carry the burden of proving that the defect was caused by the builder's ac-
tions. The statute of limitations also will limit liability. The emphasis of the
duty is to avoid hidden defects and concealed dangers.1
32
III. CONCLUSION
By denying the plaintiff's cause of action in Bonnie Built Homes, the
Ohio Supreme Court forced the subsequent purchasers to bear the entire loss
of the home's defective roof. The court relied on the archaic concept of
privity of contract as a rationale for refusing to extend the Mitchem warranty
of workmanlike construction. The court refused to accept the plaintiff's
analogy to Ohio products liability cases that did not require the parties to be in
privity to establish a claim. It supported the privity requirement by asserting
that the builder should not be placed in the position of an insurer. As addi-
tional support for its position, the court utilized the make-weight argument
that extension of a warranty is "best left up to the legislature." As this Case
Comment has shown, the court's reasoning on any point cannot withstand
any level of scrutiny.
The ultimate question in workmanlike construction cases is: Who is to
assume the risk of latent defects? In Ohio the first purchaser assumes all risks
of defects that he cannot prove were caused by the builder. The second
purchaser assumes all risks. In other states that have extended the warranty
of habitability to purchases after the first sale the builder assumes all risks due
to the defect unless he can show that the first purchaser caused the defect;
after the second purchase the builder assumes all risks unless he can prove the
defects are attributable to the first or second purchaser.
Ohio should follow the Indiana Court of Appeals and adopt a cause of
action similar to that set forth in Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., Inc. 3 3 The
action would be limited to latent defects that are not discoverable at the time
of sale and become apparent only afterwards. The burden should be on the
plaintiff to show that the builder was responsible for the defect. The builder
may rebut by presenting any evidence that would show that other factors
contributed to the defect.
The extension of a duty of workmanship to subsequent purchasers places
the second purchaser in the same position as the first purchaser. He assumes
the risk of latent defects that cannot be attributed to the builder's poor work-
manship. Thus, the builder's liability is limited, and the second purchaser is
afforded some protection. The builder cannot complain of an action that lies
because of his poor workmanship; he should be held liable for his error. The
second purchaser, although not granted absolute protection, at least receives
the same protection afforded the first purchaser.
David J. Strasser
132. Id. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 620.
133. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
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